Anglo American military cooperation in Afghanistan 2001–2014<sup>†</sup> by Chin, Warren
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
King’s Research Portal 
 
DOI:
10.1080/14794012.2016.1268790
Document Version
Peer reviewed version
Link to publication record in King's Research Portal
Citation for published version (APA):
Chin, W. (2017). Anglo American military cooperation in Afghanistan 2001–2014†. JOURNAL OF
TRANSATLANTIC STUDIES, 15, 121-142. https://doi.org/10.1080/14794012.2016.1268790
Citing this paper
Please note that where the full-text provided on King's Research Portal is the Author Accepted Manuscript or Post-Print version this may
differ from the final Published version. If citing, it is advised that you check and use the publisher's definitive version for pagination,
volume/issue, and date of publication details. And where the final published version is provided on the Research Portal, if citing you are
again advised to check the publisher's website for any subsequent corrections.
General rights
Copyright and moral rights for the publications made accessible in the Research Portal are retained by the authors and/or other copyright
owners and it is a condition of accessing publications that users recognize and abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
•Users may download and print one copy of any publication from the Research Portal for the purpose of private study or research.
•You may not further distribute the material or use it for any profit-making activity or commercial gain
•You may freely distribute the URL identifying the publication in the Research Portal
Take down policy
If you believe that this document breaches copyright please contact librarypure@kcl.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to
the work immediately and investigate your claim.
Download date: 05. Apr. 2019
 1 
 
Anglo American Military Cooperation in Afghanistan  
2001-14 
 
 
Warren Chin 
Defence Studies Department 
King’s College London 
Joint Services Command and Staff College 
Faringdon Road 
Shrivenham 
SN6 8LA 
Email: warren.a.chin@kcl.ac.uk  
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper explores a paradox. On the one hand it is believed that 9/11 rekindled the UK-US 
special relationship, but at the same time it has been argued that British mismanagement of 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan caused relations to deteriorate. Whilst I agree with part of this 
analysis in that Iraq represented a nadir in Anglo American relations I believe Afghanistan 
did not follow this trajectory.  A wide range of factors help to explain this change in fortune, 
but I focus on the role played by the British military in restoring the trust and confidence of its 
US counterpart and argue that this institutional relationship was and is a vital component in 
the Anglo American Alliance. i 
 
 
 
 
  
 2 
Introduction 
There is in Britain a rich literature on Anglo American relations.ii  In general these writings 
have focused on the extent to which the United Kingdom (UK) has enjoyed a special or 
privileged position of influence with the United States (US) foreign policy making process.  
Within this context, discussion has centred on such questions as what constitutes a special 
relationship, when did this relationship begin, why did it assume the character that it did and 
how do we explain its peaks and troughs. However, underlying much of this debate is a 
deeper question which concentrates on the perceived decline in the utility of the UK as an 
ally to the US and what can and should be done to prevent this diminution in status.iii  This 
paper touches upon these issues, but within the dynamic setting of the war on terror and 
specifically Britain's recent intervention in Afghanistan.   
Given the overcrowded state of the political and academic market on this topic it is important 
to justify why yet another piece is required on this subject. I believe analysis of this kind is 
warranted because the special relationship remains at the heart of the UK’s foreign and 
security policy and will continue to do so in the futureiv. As such, there are important lessons 
to be learned from how the alliance operated during the war in Afghanistan. This is important 
because it might help avoid the problems which it is argued came to plague the special 
relationship during the war on terror and could do so again in current conflicts involving both 
the UK and US militarily.  This view was expressed most bluntly by Patrick Porter who 
argued the UK’s alliance with the US suffered directly as a consequence of these two 
conflicts.  Instead of reinforcing the special relationship:  
 
The two wars in the ‘war on terror’ have had the reverse effect, accelerating a long 
term process: the eclipse of British power in American eyes.  In southern Iraq and 
now in Afghanistan, the flaws in the special relationship ideology have been 
underlined and exposed. v 
 
 
I recognise that problems which served to cause friction between the British and Americans 
in Iraq also surfaced in the Afghan campaign.  Thus, as in Iraq, the British government 
became deeply concerned about casualties in Afghanistan to the point where one senior 
British commander claimed that it came to dominate British strategy. He also commented on 
the lack of equipment the British possessed in both campaigns and their heavy reliance on 
the US to make up any shortfalls. Indeed, the British were such scavengers that the 
Americans nicknamed them the ‘borrowers’.vi Similarly, there were also tensions between 
the British and Americans over how best to achieve security and stability in Helmand 
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province where the British were deployed.  This tension was clearly illustrated by Wikileaks, 
which in 2010, revealed that high level US officials in the American embassy in Kabul were 
critical of British operations in Afghanistan. In these cables it was asserted that the British 
were not providing sufficient resources to cope with the Taliban in this war.  Apparently, 
Lieutenant General Dan McNeill, ISAF Commander in 2007/08, was said to be dismayed by 
British efforts and complained they had made a mess of things. In his view  their tactics were 
wrong. vii  Although more muted in his criticism of British operations in Helmand, US 
commander, General McChrystal, who took over as ISAF commander in 2009, noted that, 
although the British increased the number of troops in Helmand dramatically after 2006, this 
did not stop the Taliban from making inroads into the province. In fact, so strong was their 
presence that the British were challenged to operate beyond the immediate confines of their 
fortified bases.viii As a result, they struggled to provide security for the Afghan people.  
The UK Foreign Affairs Committee in its report of 2010 also acknowledged tensions between 
the US and UK in the conduct of military operations in Afghanistan, which when added to 
other areas of dispute brought into question the notion that there was a special relationship.ix 
The passage of time has not served to improve perceptions of these conflicts. For example, 
in 2015, Sir Christopher Meyer, former British ambassador to the US, asserted that the poor 
performance of British forces in Iraq and Afghanistan dented the UK’s military reputation in 
the US and was contrasted with the perceived success of the more recent French military 
intervention in Mali.x  
 
However, subsequent analysis of campaign in Afghanistan revealed the emergence of 
different perspective.  As Sherrard Cowper Coles, who was the British Ambassador in 
Afghanistan from 2007-09, explains in his memoir of his time in Afghanistan: 
 
If Britain wanted to make a real difference in Afghanistan it could only do so by 
working with the Americans. And, if we were to influence them, we had to show we 
were serious, about our military, political and developmental contributions. I believe 
we did that, above all on the military front.xi 
 
Further evidence of that success was confirmed by Malcolm Chalmers who noted that an 
important ingredient in the conduct of this war was the quality of the institutional relationship 
which emerged between the US and UK militaries, a view which challenges the narrative set 
out by Porter and others.xii   
 
Given the legacy of Iraq, and the even more pressing problems which emerged in 
Afghanistan, it is important to explain why and how the British military were able to achieve 
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greater cooperation. Certainly these differences in outcome suggest that we need to look 
beyond a traditional understanding of the special relationship.  As such, this paper focuses 
on how the British and Americans were able to reconstruct their political relationship via their 
respective military institutions. Whilst it looks at the Afghan campaign in its entirety the main 
focus is on the period after 2008 when first the UK and then the US undertook to review their 
strategy in Afghanistan.xiii What it reveals is how sentiment and realpolitik at the 
political/strategic level impacted for good or ill on the day to day working relationship of the 
UK and US military. However, institutional structures also emerged in Afghanistan which 
served to facilitate and reconcile the tensions between these allies.  The remainder of this 
paper will briefly explore the state of the debate on Anglo American relations and the extent 
to which they help us to understand UK-US relations in time of war. The paper will then 
consider why UK-US relations suffered in Iraq and Afghanistan and this will then be followed 
by a more detailed analysis of how British and American cooperation improved in the Afghan 
campaign. I should stress that the lion’s share of this paper focuses on the UK perspective 
of the special relationship. This was a conscious decision based on the recognition that as 
Burke explains: `the concept of a “special relationship” is very problematic, in that, in 
general, it is the weaker power which needs it: the stronger power tends to get what it wants 
without such supplication.'xiv 
In essence, special relationships are primarily the preserve of the weaker party, which is why 
it seemed sensible to focus the debate from the perspective of the UK. One further question 
that needs to be addressed is why, given the range of relations the UK has with the US have 
I chosen to focus on defence rather than say intelligence? The answer quite simply is 
because it is asserted that it is the most important and enduring aspect of the institutional 
connections linking the UK and US. Certainly this was the view of Baylis, who argued that 
the defence/security dimension was the defining trait of the Anglo American relationship.xv  
This position was reaffirmed more recently by Wallace and Phillips who assert: ‘Defence 
cooperation was at the heart of the special relationship from the outset, and remains central 
to it,’xvi a view echoed more recently by Dumbrell who stated: ‘the British armed forces are 
one of the main instruments through which the special relationship is symbolised, asserted 
and measured.’xvii  Whilst the importance of this domain declined in the benign security 
environment which emerged in the immediate post cold war era, leading some to declare the 
end of the special relationship,xviii 9/11 put defence firmly back on the agenda. Wyn Rees 
points out this struggle against terrorism was not solely a military conflict and that it had 
other important dimensions but the hard edge of military power came to play a dominant role 
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in the US response and this placed increased importance on the UK’s military and strategic 
assets. xix   
 
 
Examining the utility of the existing literature in helping us to understand the 
dynamics of the UK-US relationship in the post cold war era and war on terror 
 
In looking at the literature on Anglo American relations, Dobson and Marsh divide this 
research into two schools of thought: sentimentalists and realists. In their view: 
 
The former see shared values, culture, democratic principles, and kinship, all leading 
to habits of cooperation and shared attitudes about how to deal with international 
issues, as the source and the being of what they conceive of as a special 
relationship. The latter see shared and overlapping interests forming a utilitarian or 
functional relationship that will only continue as a special so long as the common 
interests abide and each side can be of importance to the other.xx  
 
The role of these forces in shaping the special relationship both in the past and present are 
acknowledged, but it is not clear they explain the shifts that have recently taken place within 
it during the war on terror. If we look first at the importance of interests, one official in the US 
Embassy explained in blunt terms that the American relationship with the UK is based on the 
pursuit of hard interests rather than some vague sentimentalityxxi.  However, it is not certain 
this provides a cogent explanation of UK-US relations in the post-cold war era. If we look at 
this within the broader context of the UK’s role in NATO it serves to highlight this 
inconsistency.  According to Stephen Walt, alliances are created by states in response to 
clear external threats. By combining in this way a state can either join a larger potential 
hegemon or it can seek to ally with other weaker states in the hope this will result in a 
balance of power between the threatened and threatening state. Viewed in this way, 
alliances are rational and utilitarian.xxii  As such, once the threat disappears, as it did with the 
demise of the Soviet Union, so too should the alliance, in this case NATO.xxiii  Walt’s 
explanation for the endurance of the alliance rests on the belief that the US was willing to 
pay a disproportionate share of the costs of NATO in an effort to maintain influence over its 
allies. Member states benefitted from this transaction because it reduced their national 
defence costs.xxiv  This argument rings true, but in an alliance defence is a transnational 
public good and it is difficult to limit which states benefit from increases in American defence 
spending.xxv  This explains why members of the alliance have a vested interest in spending 
less on defence. However, Walt’s argument cannot explain why states like the UK spent 
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more on defence in the post cold war era than its European counterparts.xxvi It also fails to 
explain why the UK was so willing to put itself in harms way during the war on terror.   
The inability of the realists to demonstrate conclusively the relationship between interests 
and alliances and the oscillations of the UK and US relationship leads us to the second 
school of thought which focuses on shared language, values and culture and consequently a 
shared vision of how the world should be governed. Some might interpret this as delusion 
and Porter, for example, argues that in the UK this is an ideology which was designed to 
legitimise Britain’s preferred international role as a world or pivotal power.xxvii  However 
delusional this mind set is, it might help explain why the UK has been willing to assume a 
greater defence burden in the interests of preserving the special relationship in the past and 
the present. The problem is, as Dobson and Marsh explain, the sentiment school does not 
try to theorise the relationship but focuses instead on a wealth of detail to make their case. 
Their goal, it seems, is to proselytise the virtues of the special relationship without thinking 
about the costs incurred.xxviii  Delving more deeply into the sentimental school takes us into 
the realms of constructivism which assumes the values of societies shape their identities, 
interests and perceptions of threat. Most important, is the possibility for states to share a 
common world view as the UK and US are assumed to do.xxix However, although this view is 
persuasive it implies a relationship which is constant over time, but precisely the opposite 
happened during the war on terror.  
In explaining why alliances endure, even when there is no longer a compelling external logic 
for cooperation between states, Walt also explores the power of transnational institutions like 
NATO which, over time, create what he terms security communities which share a common 
vision of how national militaries should operate.xxx Liberal institutionalists also argue that 
international organisations have led to greater cooperation and this resulted in the creation 
of values and norms which shape the policies of its member states.xxxi  However, we still 
come back to the fundamental problem of explaining why only the UK rather than all of 
NATO assumed the role it did in the war on terror.  
It might be that bilateral rather than transnational institutions have an important role to play 
in explaining the ebb and flow of higher alliance politics. Indeed, Wallace and Phillips argue 
that the special relationship has two important strands which might help us to better 
understand the UK’s behaviour.  The first, and most difficult to measure, describes the 
historical, cultural and linguistic connections that make the UK-US relationship unique.xxxii  
The second level focuses on the day-to-day aspects of the special relationship and explores 
the connections between the institutions of the respective states.xxxiii This point is reinforced 
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by Haglund, who argues that an intrinsically important part of the UK and US special 
relationship is the extent to which it became locked in or institutionalised.xxxiv Thus, in his 
view, although the US and UK enjoyed a détente in relations in the second half of the 
nineteenth century and during the First World War, this friendship remained subject to the 
vagaries of international and domestic politics and both parties relied instead on a form of 
sub optimal cooperation in the inter war period. This changed in the Second World War and 
after 1940 Haglund believes a set of institutional arrangements was put in place that `would 
culminate in the two countries becoming what they remain today, two reliable allies between 
whom an armed conflict simply is taken to be a logical absurdity.’xxxv  
It is interesting to note that when I spoke to a senior civil servant in MOD he stressed how 
much importance the British and Americans placed on maintaining strong connections 
between the MOD and Department of Defence (DOD). To this end the UK sent a small cabal 
of MOD civil servants to work in DOD and he would meet his counterpart in the US at least 
once a year to reinforce these bonds.xxxvi The UK also has military officers serving in many 
American military commands and vice versa; it was calculated that in 2013 MOD had 573 of 
its personnel working in the US.xxxvii How then did this institutional connection translate 
beyond the bureaucracy of MOD and DOD into the field of operations?  Neo institutionalism 
looks closely at how the connections between different national institutions can lead to what 
is termed institutional isomorphism.  This construct challenges the idea that all institutions 
are competitive and evolve and adapt in a way which should in theory lead to a wide array of 
differing institutional structures in areas like defence. Instead, they focus on the question 
why organisations come to look so similar.  In the case of defence, the key to understanding 
this process of homogenisation can be explained by the values and norms of the military 
profession which have an idealised sense of what an effective and legitimate military 
organisation should look like, in this case military institutions copy what they perceive to be 
more successful militaries. xxxviii  Whilst this does not explain the preferences of a state it 
does reveal the important linkages between the militaries of different nations and 
emphasises how a special relationship might become institutionalised. Whilst this can be 
applied across the western world, in the case of the UK and US military the quality of 
cooperation achieved during the Second World War and the consolidation of this experience 
in the Cold War provided a stronger range of institutional linkages. Indeed these linkages are 
celebrated annually in the Kermit Roosevelt lectures in which senior US and British 
commanders lecture to a military audience in their ally’s country.  In sum, understanding 
Anglo American relations requires us to think in terms of a tripod in which interests, and 
sentimentality are harnessed institutionally to combine to create something more than a 
mere alliance. This synergy is explored in the context of the war on terror in the next section. 
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The Iraq debacle 
 
The first real tensions in the UK-US relationship in the war on terror surfaced in the 
aftermath of the invasion of Iraq. The British were frustrated by their inability to shape US 
policy in the post war occupation of the country.  For example, the Coalition Provisional 
Authority (CPA) failed to consult the UK when they decided to disband Iraq’s military and 
instituted de-Ba'athification; a decision which provided a trained pool of manpower for the 
plethora of insurgent groups which flourished in Iraq after the fall of Saddam’s regime.xxxix 
Similarly, the British military became increasingly uneasy about the methods employed by 
the Americans to pacify and stabilise those areas under US control and concluded there was 
a connection between American use of force and the rising level of violence amongst the 
Iraqi people.  A number of British observers commented on the relative calm of the British 
area of occupation called Multi National Division South East (MND SE) compared to the 
American occupation zone and cited this as evidence of the superiority of the British military 
in its role as an occupying power.xl  From the American perspective, tension with their British 
ally increased as the security problem spread to the British occupation zone.  According to 
several sources, the British military exaggerated their ability to keep south eastern Iraq and 
Basra quiet, but by 2007 it was increasingly apparent they were losing control of the 
situation which proved enormously frustrating for the Americans who feared for the security 
of their line of supply from Kuwait.xli  This problem was compounded by the divergence in the 
political and military priorities of the Americans and their British ally.  In basic terms, the 
American operational plan for Iraq changed in 2007 and a concerted effort was made to 
surge US forces to stabilise a country which seemed on the verge of civil war.  In contrast, 
the British continued to withdraw from Iraq, even though the security situation did not always 
support such action. Matters came to a head when, in 2008, the Malaki Government 
launched a major offensive to secure control of Basra, the principal city in what had been the 
British occupation zone.  This attack was conducted with the support of US forces, but it is 
claimed the British were not consulted and it was inferred by the media that this snub 
demonstrated how frustrated the Americans were with their British military counterparts.xlii  It 
is important to note that British military commanders in Iraq during this time have challenged 
this viewxliii, but evidence from other sources suggests US frustration with the British was not 
simply a product of the febrile imagination of the media.xliv  Ironically, the British military’s 
urgency to exit Iraq was caused in part by the escalation in its commitment to the war in 
Afghanistan which began with the deployment of 3,000 troops to Helmand in 2006. The next 
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section focuses on Afghanistan and explores the latent and actual tensions which emerged 
in the political and military domain of this war. 
 
Centrifugal Forces which impacted on the UK-US Special Relationship in Afghanistan 
 
The debate over Iraq set out above illustrates a general problem which characterises any 
deliberation on the special relationship: how do you provide a metric which allows more than 
an impressionistic measure of its peaks and troughs.  Looking at this issue in the context of 
a war does however provide a partial solution to this problem as the principal issues and 
debates often assume a more tangible form because there is so much more at stake for 
each ally.  For example, we can determine how far the political goals of the allies in war 
converge or not.  Similarly, we can also assess the extent to which there is common 
agreement and understanding on how military power is to be employed to achieve the goals 
of this war. Finally, war often helps crystallise our thoughts regarding the risks accepted by 
each ally and the costs they are willing to pay to ensure strategic success.   
 
If we apply this metric to Iraq we can see there was a strong agreement on the political aims 
of the war, but apparently some concern within the UK over the post war reconstruction plan 
and the subsequent way in which the US used its military power to stabilise Iraq and restore 
national governance.  Similarly, whilst willing to take the lead for security and development in 
MND SE, the British proved unwilling to increase the risks they faced by deploying forces to 
assist their American ally in more violent parts of the country and even in MND SE 
casualties became an increasingly sensitive political issue in the UK.xlv   
 
Interestingly, exactly the same pattern emerged in the war in Afghanistan.  For example, at 
the political level, there was a strong convergence between the US and UK over the 
justification for war in 2001 and what they wanted to achieve. From the perspective of the 
British they could legitimately claim they had an important stake in this war as 67 British 
civilians were killed by Al Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11.  Indeed a statement made by the Foreign 
Affairs Committee made clear, British involvement in this war stemmed just as much from a 
sense of moral right as national interest: 
 
The events of 11 September demonstrated clearly that a narrow definition of 
“national interest” is no longer sufficient. The international terrorist threat from 
organisations such as al Qaeda may be directed most immediately against the 
United States, but such attacks affect British interests and security, and may in future 
be directed against the United Kingdom. .xlvi 
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The war against terrorism is an unplanned and unsought conflict. But when the first 
hijacked airliner struck the World Trade Center, war became necessary and, once 
entered upon, war must be pursued vigorously and with all appropriate means.’ xlvii 
 
According to the Foreign Affairs Committee, the UK government’s objectives shaped the 
early stages of the war against international terrorism.xlviii  This appears to have extended 
into the preparations for Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF).  President Bush, declared the 
US’s goals were as follows:  the destruction of terrorist training camps and associated 
infrastructure within Afghanistan, the capture of al Qaeda’s leadership and the ending of all 
terrorist activity within Afghanistan and bringing about the downfall of the Taliban.  In giving 
evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in 2001, the Foreign Secretary, Jack Straw, made 
clear these objectives had been formulated by both the UK and US governments. As he 
explained:  
 
The policy guiding the use of UK military assets in OEF was set by President Bush 
and our Prime Minister, Tony Blair in terms of the overall objectives of this military 
action which are, as you know, to bring Osama bin Laden and his key associates to 
justice or justice to him, to break up completely the al-Qaeda terrorist network, and-
because theTaliban refuse to cooperate-to break up the Taliban as well. That is the 
policy.xlix  
 
As in Iraq, there was a strong political consensus on the need to remove a specific threat, 
but important political differences emerged as the campaign went into the post conflict 
phase. This difference of opinion was summed up succinctly by Kampfner who said: ‘to the 
Americans, the question of staying in Afghanistan for the duration was secondary. To Blair it 
was vital.’  During the Labour Conference in 2001, Blair had declared: “We will not walk 
away from Afghanistan, as the outside world has done so many times before”.l  
Consequently, for the British, it was vital to address the social and economic ills that existed 
in Afghanistan in an attempt to remove the permissive conditions which gave rise to the 
emergence of the Taliban and Al Qaeda.  A mix of motivations played out here. First and 
most important Blair needed to sell the war in Afghanistan to his own party which was largely 
hostile to Bush’s unilateral foreign policy.  Although 9/11 caused this criticism to become 
more muted it was not long before many within the Labour party questioned Bush’s 
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approach to the war and Blair’s desire to support the US at any price.  Second, was his 
commitment to a humanitarian agenda.li 
 
A good illustration of this tension between the Americans and British can be seen in the 
discussions which took place on the subject of the International Security Assistance Force 
(ISAF) which came into existence in early 2002. In general, there was broad agreement on 
the need to stabilise and reconstruct Afghanistan and remove any ungoverned space which 
Al Qaeda might exploit, but important divisions emerged between the UK and US over the 
size, composition and role of this peacekeeping force.  The British strongly supported the 
creation of a force of about 25,000 troops to secure all the principal cities in the country.  
They also offered to take charge until another nation could be found to act as the lead 
nation. The American position acknowledged the need for a peacekeeping force but, 
because of an innate hostility to the use of US troops in nation building and peacekeeping, 
they preferred other nations to take on this role.lii However, in the case of Afghanistan, their 
hostility also extended to the deployment of any peacekeeping force beyond Kabul. The 
British commander of the first ISAF mission, Lt Gen Jon McColl, drew up a plan which 
demonstrated how the ISAF mission could be expanded, but he claims he was ordered to 
stop these preparations by the British government because Donald Rumsfeld, the US 
Defence Secretary, refused to sanction this action.  It seems the only reason why the 
Americans were prepared to authorise ISAF’s footprint in Kabul was because they 
recognised the need to support the new Afghan government under Hamid Karzai and that, if 
this was to happen, security needed to be provided so the bureaucracy could function 
properly and safely.  It would also ensure political leaders from all factions would come to 
Kabul.liii 
For the Americans their overriding goal was to kill or capture Osama bin Laden and as many 
of his fighters as possible. As such, the collapse of the Taliban merely facilitated the 
achievement of this goal.  Having peacekeepers deployed across Afghanistan could get in 
the way of their counterterrorist campaign. Their second goal was not to repeat the military 
mistakes made by the Soviets and become embroiled in a long and protracted occupation of 
the country.liv  Thus, even though the Taliban leadership fled to Pakistan in early December 
2001, the US military continued to conduct large scale operations to sweep up the remnants 
of Al Qaeda and the Taliban which remained trapped in the country; hence operations like 
Tora Bora and Anaconda.  Thereafter they relied on a combination of special forces and 
local warlords to support them in their pursuit of Al Qaeda.lv  Eventually a compromise over 
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ISAF was agreed and a force of 5,000 peacekeepers under the leadership of the British was 
allowed to deploy in Kabul, but their mandate did not extend beyond the city.  So determined 
were the Americans to keep ISAF and OEF separate that a British request to deploy the 
British ISAF contingent under OEF command was politely but firmly declined.lvi   
The British chose not to challenge the US on this issue because they realised their ally was 
shifting the focus of its military machine to Iraq. Obviously the British chose to support what 
many subsequently believed was the biggest strategic blunder in the war on terror - the 
decision to invade Iraqlvii, but they remained engaged in the development of Afghanistan via 
their involvement in reconstruction and development in Kabul and in the north of the country. 
Most important, the UK played a leading role in getting the international community to invest 
in Afghanistan and, as a result of the London Compact in 2006, promised to provide $800 
million in aid as part of a five year development plan. The UK’s commitment to the 
humanitarian agenda was clearly demonstrated because it was the second most generous 
aid donor to Afghanistan after the United States.lviii 
 
This benign strategic status quo came to an end as the US found itself militarily over 
extended in Iraq. Confronted by a resource challenge caused by fighting two wars 
simultaneously it became necessary to call upon its allies to take on a heavier burden in 
Afghanistan whilst it sought to stabilise Iraq. Of central importance in the proposed 
expansion of allied forces in Afghanistan was the employment of a substantial British 
contingent of troops in Helmand.  Sadly, once the UK agreed to expand its military 
commitment in Afghanistan the same challenges which faced the British in Iraq emerged in 
Helmand. The underlying problem was how to achieve an equitable distribution of cost, 
benefit and risk between allied forces, which according to Cimbala represented a new 
challenge in the game of burden sharing in NATO. lix 
 
One of the most important aspects of the campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq was the way in 
which states pursued what might be termed negative as well a positive goals.  These former 
objectives were undeclared and yet promoted the interests of a national government above 
the needs of its allies or indeed the achievement of the strategic goals of the campaign.  
Usually these negative goals were articulated through the use of national caveats and were 
identified as one of the most difficult problems facing the ISAF commander in terms of being 
able to manoeuvre his forces. Apparently over 70 different caveats needed to be taken into 
account by the ISAF commander when planning an operation.lx  Typically the use of national 
caveats arose where there was a perceived imbalance between the interests of the national 
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government and actual and potential costs of the operation they were being asked to 
support.lxi  
 
Had the Helmand plan gone as hoped and the British left after three years without firing a 
single shot then this issue might not have raised its ugly head in Afghanistan. But instead of 
deploying into a semi permissive environment, the task force quickly became engaged in a 
ferocious battle with the Taliban. The fighting in Helmand, post 2006, was so severe it was 
estimated that British troops fighting in this province faced three times as many attacks as 
other NATO forces in the next most violent province of Kandahar.lxii  Not surprisingly then the 
same kind of strategic and operational tensions which characterised Anglo American military 
cooperation in Iraq also arose in Afghanistan. Once the severity of this threat was 
understood by the British government it induced a sense of caution in terms of the conduct 
of their campaign and these negative goals came to the fore.   
 
A British general who served in Kabul believes preservation of the British military contingent 
in Afghanistan came to dominate government thinking on the war.  If you compared the UK 
and US political objectives for this campaign on the surface there was strong agreement on 
what needed to be done, but in reality the British had another agenda.  In the case of the 
American political and military establishment, by the time you got to the latter stages of the 
campaign the goal focused on how to use military power to achieve a favourable political 
settlement locally and how the use of force impacted on the wider war regionally and even 
globally.  Viewed in this way, the US military were trying to think operationally and 
strategically about the conduct of this war.  In contrast, the UK government thought only 
about its forces in Helmand province and quite often this zoomed in on the strategically 
important town of Sangin where over 100 British soldiers had been killed.  He notes that at a 
meeting between the Prime Minister and US President on Afghanistan, the British kept 
raising the plight of their forces in Sangin, but unfortunately the American President had not 
been briefed on this subject as the meeting was supposed to be about strategic issues.  In 
his view, the British government’s primary concern was to avoid casualties which caused 
them to think only in tactical terms.  This had an important impact on the British military and 
limited the extent to which they could cooperate with their American counterparts.  This was 
most clearly reflected in the way in which the chain of command operated.  In simple terms, 
once the British deployed combat forces to Helmand in 2006 the brigade commander 
became the national contingent commander and was therefore responsible for looking after 
UK interests. As a result, although there was a NATO/ISAF chain of command the most 
important command chain for the British brigade commander was the one which was located 
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in the UK Permanent Joint Headquarters (PJHQ) and the Chief of the Defence Staff.  This 
ensured the UK government maintained a tight rein on the conduct of UK military 
operations.lxiii   
 
Given the similarities between Iraq and Afghanistan why didn’t we see a similar deterioration 
in Anglo American military and political relations in this latter conflict? Indeed, it would seem 
there was greater potential for squabbling between the two allies in Afghanistan because 
this operation took place in the shadow of Iraq and it is claimed shaped American attitudes 
towards the British.lxiv  At the strategic level there were also profound differences between 
the US and UK on other aspects of the war. For example there were tensions on how to 
conduct counter narcotics and the eradication of poppy cultivation.lxv  The UK took the lead 
on tackling the opium industry in Afghanistan, but its actions seemed to exacerbate rather 
than resolve the problem. Its policy in 2002 was to compensate farmers for eradication of 
their opium crops, but this backfired and led to a dramatic increase in poppy cultivation.lxvi  In 
addition landowners failed to distribute the compensation paid for eradication to smaller 
farmers and this caused resentment towards the Afghan government.  As a result, the policy 
was abandoned in the first year and both the British and Americans moved towards a 
strategy of eradication and interdiction of the crop. But overall, the UK’s policy of eradication 
failed to prevent a dramatic increase in opium production which rose from 1000 tons in 2001 
to over 6000 tons by 2006. This caused considerable frustration within the US government 
and calls for it to step in and take the lead. One solution put forward within the American 
government was to employ aerial crop spraying, a development which the UK government 
opposedlxvii.  In truth, aerial eradication also proved to be a divisive issue within the Bush 
administration, but in late 2007 the National Security Council (NSC), authorised its use.lxviii 
 
This failure was reinforced as the war against the Taliban expanded and it became clear 
they were deriving a significant income from the sale of opium. At the same time, in an effort 
to prevent the alienation of local farmers in southern Afghanistan, British, Canadians and 
Dutch commanders were accused of failing to eradicate this crop, even though the policy 
was sanctioned by the Afghan government. In contrast, the US military agreed in 2004 to 
expand its mission to include interdiction of opium trafficking but left the task of eradication 
to the State Department.lxix  Most importantly from the perspective of the resolution of the 
war were the discussions between the British and Americans over the Taliban.  The British 
maintained that an important part of long term conflict resolution in Afghanistan required the 
Afghan government to open negotiations with the Taliban, a position which was opposed by 
the Americans until late in the war.lxx   
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As in Iraq questions were also raised about the different strategic cultures of UK and US 
forces and how this might cause friction in Afghanistan. lxxi  These suspicions seemed to be 
confirmed almost as soon as the British deployed into Helmand in 2006. As the British 
Brigade commander of the time noted there was a contradiction in terms of what the British 
were trying to do in terms of generating local security and stability in Helmand and US 
military special forces which were also operating in the same area and conducting 
counterterrorism operations.lxxii  This had the negative effect of undermining what the British 
were doing as US counter terror operations caused inadvertent civilian casualties, which the 
British were then blamed for causing, and which undermined their efforts to win the hearts 
and minds of the people. For example, in September 2006, a company of Fusiliers 
witnessed an attack by an AC 130 Gunship in support of a US special forces in an area just 
outside Now Zad which resulted in civilian casualties and violent protest which they were 
forced to deal with. Even in summer 2007, a commander in Sangin requested that US 
special forces operating in his district should be removed because they were having a 
damaging effect on the British hearts and minds campaign. lxxiii  There was also a clash 
between US and UK commanders in 2006 which caused US Major General, Ben Freakley to 
threaten to `knock British Brigadier Ed Butler’s lights out’.  The cause of this incident was 
the decision made by Butler to deviate from the agreed plan and respond to the request of 
the Afghan government to prevent the fall of northern Helmand to the Taliban.  It is 
interesting to note that Butler was deeply critical of Freakley’s frustration which he believed 
revealed a lack of understanding of the challenges of higher command. This he attributed to 
the lack of experience US senior officers had in irregular wars where political considerations 
frequently dominated military logic.lxxiv In sum, Afghanistan seemed to be even more of a 
‘minefield’ for UK-US relations than Iraq.  
 
 
 
Centripetal Forces which sustained alliance cohesion in Afghanistan 
 
What then happened in Afghanistan which allowed a closer and more effective working 
relationship between the UK and US military?  In my view the elements that made up the 
special relationship provided a permissive environment within which to engender a close 
working alliance in both Iraq and Afghanistan, but a specific sequence of events helped 
bring this to the fore in the latter conflict. In essence, a catalyst was created which allowed 
the British to exploit the generic benefits of the special relationship in Kabul and Helmand.  
The first point I would make here is that the intangibles of the special relationship, which 
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focus on a sense of shared history, understanding of the US and most importantly language, 
did play a part in helping the UK to make itself indispensable to the US in Afghanistan.  
However, as one British Colonel explained, whilst this facilitated and eased social relations 
in a US dominated chain of command it did not guarantee influence.  This required British 
officers to demonstrate their competence as staff officers or in the field of operations, 
depending on where they were deployed. In his view, the British usually excelled because, in 
contrast to their American counterparts, their training was diverse and comprehensive.  This 
stemmed not from some innate martial superiority of the British but from the fact that, 
because the British army was so small, its officer corps could not role specialise in the way 
US army officers could.  In sum, British officers possessed a good understanding of 
formation level planning as a whole and this enabled them to demonstrate their value in a 
large headquarters. 
 
In addition, he also believed the British were careful when choosing their posts in the US 
chain of command.lxxv Thus, even though in the later stages of the war in Helmand, the 
British provided one third of the force, they accounted for only 15-20% of posts in the 
regional command headquarters. However, these posts allowed the British to maintain 
influence in an American dominated chain of command.lxxvi  Obviously, these observations 
can be extended to the British military’s time in Iraq and this suggests that, whilst these 
connections gave the British a comparative advantage, they were not enough to sustain the 
military relationship. However, other factors discussed below served to increase the 
importance of both these elements of UK US military cooperation in Afghanistan. 
 
There were three important differences in terms of how the UK US alliance was managed in 
Afghanistan which I believe made a fundamental difference in terms of countering centrifugal 
forces present in Afghanistan.  The first and most important was the fact that, in contrast to 
Iraq, the British were not looking to withdraw from Afghanistan but rather to expand their role 
in this campaign.  As such, the UK investment in Helmand escalated rapidly with a threefold 
increase in the number of troops in theatre by 2009. Similarly the £3 billion estimated cost to 
conduct the operation over three years stood at nearly £14.5 billion by 2010.lxxvii  This 
apparently sent the right signals and impressed the Americans that the UK was doing more 
than posturing.lxxviii  Certainly in the time of the Bush Administration its focus was on Iraq and 
the British deployment allowed them to concentrate on that problem.  In contrast, the Obama 
Administration was forced to deal immediately with Afghanistan and sanctioned a surge of 
American forces into the country in an effort to stabilise the situation. Again the UK remained 
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a vital component in this new strategy.  It was not simply the material and manpower 
provided by the UK, but also where they were located which enhanced their importance. 
Although only one percent of the Afghan population lived in Helmand it became the principal 
frontline in this war.  As a result, the British had a prominent position in U.S. strategy.  
Equally important, the level of the threat in Helmand meant that the British were 
automatically exposed to a high degree of risk and required help from their allies.  Of 
particular importance here is how the UK’s sacrifices compared to those of its NATO/ISAF 
allies. A persistent cause of friction between the US and its allies was the belief that America 
was bearing the burden of this war virtually alone.lxxix However, the US military also 
recognised `that the UK, Dutch and Canadians had carried the brunt of the fight in the south’ 
with no support from nations like Germany or France.lxxx  In contrast, in Iraq the British were 
in a relatively benign zone of occupation, but were constantly being asked to reinforce US 
forces involved in heavy fighting elsewhere.  As has been said, such requests were politely 
declined and inevitably this became a source of friction.lxxxi   
 
The second important development was the recognition that, after seven years of war, ISAF 
still had no strategy for achieving their political objectives in Afghanistan. As Admiral Mike 
Mullen, chairman of the US Joint Chiefs of Staff put it: `In Afghanistan, we do what we can.' 
In Iraq, we do what we must. lxxxii  One of the first actions of the new Obama Presidency in 
2009 was to address this deficiency.  What followed was important, not simply because it 
averted disaster in the short term, but, more importantly, because of the impact this had on 
the US and UK alliance.  For example, at the highest political level the British believed they 
made an important contribution to the US strategic review of Afghanistan and, as a result, a 
consensus emerged on what needed to be done, a process which was largely absent in the 
later stages of the Iraq campaign.lxxxiii Perhaps the most noticeable aspect of this was the 
recognition on both sides of the Atlantic that any strategy for Afghanistan also had to include 
Pakistan.lxxxiv 
 
The introduction of a military strategy or operational campaign plan created greater unity of 
effort within the coalition in that there was now a plan. Most importantly, the British military 
supported this plan because it conformed to what they believed needed to be done in 
Afghanistan which was a comprehensive counterinsurgency strategy supported by a surge 
of NATO troops.  Indeed, both American and British military staff training and education 
focused on preparing officers to understand and become skilled at campaigning at the 
operational level and so it was not surprising that the British military were willing to support 
this innovation.  In addition, the British were also strong admirers of American 
counterinsurgency as it evolved in the latter stages of the Iraq campaign and whilst the 
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British army had its own COIN manual it still required its officers to read and understand US 
COIN doctrine as captured in FM 3-24.  Thus, according to the House of Commons Defence 
Committee, the new COIN strategy employed by the Americans in Afghanistan under 
McChrystal was a continuation of what the UK had already been doing in Afghanistan, but 
this had been badly under resourced.lxxxv  . 
 
As important were structural and procedural changes which took place within the theatre of 
operations, which provided a mechanism through which to implement the new plan. In 
addition it also served to reanimate the conceptual and institutional linkages between the UK 
and US military.  In 2009 ISAF was composed of 42 nations which together deployed 61,000 
troops within five regional commands.  In addition, there were a further 57,000 US troops 
fighting under a different chain of command within OEFlxxxvi. All of these elements were 
fighting their own separate wars and consequently one of the basic maxims of war was not 
followed, i.e. the need to link tactical actions to achieve strategic effect.  The absence of a 
higher authority above the regional commands allowed the British, for example, to subvert 
ISAF orders when they conflicted with UK objectives such as the need to avoid UK 
casualties.lxxxvii 
 
In an attempt to address this deficiency, the Americans created the ISAF Joint Command 
(IJC) which was empowered to coordinate the five Afghan regional commandslxxxviii. A more 
difficult challenge, which took several months to resolve, was bringing the USMC, which 
deployed into Helmand in 2009, and US Special Forces who served under OEF under the 
operational control of the ISAF commander. lxxxix The ability of RC South, under which the 
British Task Force Helmand (TFH) was initially subordinated, was also enhanced with the 
deployment of a UK divisional headquarters in November 2009.  This formation had been 
raised in 2007 and reflected the need for a higher formation to direct and coordinate the 
various forces operating within southern Afghanistan. xc The need for such higher level 
direction was amplified with the deployment of 20,000 US Marines into Helmand. It is 
claimed that frictions quickly emerged between US and UK forces operating in Helmand 
over resources and missions. xci In this case, the UK divisional headquarters was able to limit 
the freedom of action of national contingents and impose some order on brigade 
commanders.  Certainly in the case of the British brigade commander his freedom of action 
was far more limited than that experienced by his predecessors and instead of creating his 
own plan of operations he now worked to a concept of operations designed in Kabul and or 
RC South.  This also resulted indirectly in a reduction in the political clout exerted by the 
brigade commander, especially as RC South was also commanded by a British general in 
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2009-10. It was hoped that at the very least this set up would cause the actions of the 
brigade commander to be tempered by the wisdom and experience of the divisional 
commander.xcii 
 
The political power of the Brigade commander was further diluted by the enhancement of the 
role of Deputy Commander ISAF, which was a post allocated to the British. It seems that the 
UK Chief of the Defence Staff, General Richards, wanted to increase British influence in 
Kabul and ensure greater harmony was achieved in terms of US and UK military planning. 
Consequently, General Nick Parker was appointed to the post, but was also made national 
contingent commander, which in theory meant he and not the Brigadier in Helmand would 
represent the view of the British government.  This change allowed the army to make more 
nuanced judgments when trying to protect the interests of the UK and it was hoped that, 
because of the greater experience and seniority of the Deputy Commander and the remit of 
his post, he could achieve a better balance between US and UK interests in a way that did 
not damage the special relationship.   This change had an important bearing on the quality 
of the UK’s alliance with the Americans and it was noted that in the case of Iraq the 
unwillingness of the British to become integrated in the US chain of command in Baghdad 
was cited as a reason why the relationship soured to the extent that it did.xciii  In truth, 
General Parker struggled in this role. In his view, there was a lack of understanding of the 
theatre strategic level and in particular the decision making process in Kabul. As result, his 
ability to act as a national contingent commander was handicapped by a lack of resources. 
Only in Kabul could the British hope to shape the campaign but too much attention was 
focused on Helmand. xciv   
The importance of the institutional dimension of the special relationship in Afghanistan was 
challenged to some extent as Task Force Helmand came under the command of the United 
States Marine Corps (USMC) in RC South West. xcv  This created an interesting test for the 
British military in that it had little experience of cooperating with American marines.  It is also 
clear that at the start of this friendship the British struggled to comprehend the nature of the 
USMC.  As one senior British commander commented: 
 
It took some time and a lot of effort to work out how the USMC functioned. In this case, 
the command and control function, the processes, right down to the basics of what do 
they expect, how do you bid for resources, how to play the game; play by their rules of 
their game rather than our own.  We got very good at it; we were outperforming our 
counterparts in Task Force Leatherneck when it came to bidding for resources or 
submitting CONOPS.xcvi 
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This statement downplays the initial frictions that emerged between the British military and 
the USMC as they deployed into Helmand. The USMC was openly critical at the perceived 
lack of progress made by the British in Helmand and their failure to deliver on promises 
made to the people in terms of reconstruction and development. The Americans were also 
appalled at how the Afghan military was segregated from their British counterparts on UK 
bases. Tensions also emerged in the marines’ first operation to push into Nawa, Garmser 
and Khan Neshin, The British did not see the point of pushing into a sparsely populated part 
of Helmand.  But marine commanders believed it was important to show they were carrying 
out the wishes of the provincial governor.xcvii For their part, the British were critical of the 
aggressiveness shown by the USMC in their efforts to stabilise and secure those districts 
under their control, which it was claimed was making the insurgency worse.  In response US 
marine commanders accused the British of appeasing the Taliban which was why they were 
able to exist in relative peace in other districts of the province. The British were also anxious 
that the handover of Sangin and Musa Qala, two of the most violent areas in Helmand, to 
the USMC resembled their withdrawal from Basra and this too became a source of 
tension.xcviii   
 
How then do we explain the close interaction that emerged between two military institutions? 
Sentiment seems to have played some part in this. It is claimed that an important factor in 
improving relations between these two forces was the realisation amongst American 
commanders of the sacrifices made by the British and the burden they carried; so, for 
example, although the British had 30 percent of the troops in Helmand, they were 
responsible for 70 percent of the population. The British also suffered higher casualties than 
their American counterparts, a point highlighted by the UK task force commander in a 
meeting with the USMC in 2010.  There was also a concern that as British casualties 
mounted in 2009 domestic political support for the war in the UK was falling away and 
something needed to be done to reverse this trend.  Interestingly, the sensitivity of this issue 
was brought home to American political advisor, Kael Weston, in a meeting with UK foreign 
secretary David Milliband who asked the Americans to help relieve the pressure on the 
British. In response Weston sent a memo titled ‘US-UK relations at a crossroads’. In this 
communication he advised that the US needed to ease the UK out of the toughest parts of 
Helmand. US ambassador Karl Eikenberry referred this request to Secretary of State, Hilary 
Clinton, who agreed this should be done. xcix 
 
According to a British officer who served in the USMC headquarters in Helmand, the British 
army and the USMC, in spite of the problems alluded to earlier, actually had much in 
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common. Both were small and agile formations and this provided a common bond from 
which it was possible to build a shared understanding of what needed to be done. He 
described the relationship between the British army and USMC as awesome. Both 
institutions and personality played a key role in making things work and as a senior staff 
officer he felt absolutely empowered and did not feel he had an American minder looking 
over his shoulder. In fact the relationship was so successful that the British army looked at 
ways in which to maintain contact with the USMC post Afghanistan.  In the end this 
aspiration was allowed to whither as it became clear that in the future they were more likely 
to work with the US army than marines.c It is also possible to argue that, even though there 
was little in the way of formal connections between the British army and the USMC, their 
training and education did provide a degree of connectivity and a common ground for 
cooperation in that they followed similar training and educational programmes, which 
allowed close cooperation with the US army. 
Another important reason why UK US military cooperation worked so well in Helmand was 
because of the investment made in training with the USMC.  In the view of one British officer 
training was more important than any long standing institutional connection.  He found the 
pre deployment training he did with the Americans before going to Afghanistan extremely 
important.  It ensured you understood the American planning system and battle rhythm of 
the 400 staff in RC South West. ci  A large number of British staff officers did the training 
before deploying but some did not and, in his view, those who did not struggled to get into 
this working rhythm.  One of the problems which made it difficult to provide this level of 
training more widely was that British policy is for soldiers to do 6 month tours. This 
stipulation limits how much training can be done before being deployed. In addition 
personnel tend not to be identified until near the time of their deployment. Shortage of time 
thus limited how long they could spend on training if they were going to do a six month tour. 
Finally, the British army gapped posts for officers of the rank of lieutenant colonel and below, 
which meant unit commanders were reluctant to release staff until the very last minute.  He 
was unusual in that he had disbanded his regiment and then had several months free before 
going to Afghanistan. This allowed him to go to the US for longer than normal and to commit 
to serving in Afghanistan for twelve months.  He also pointed out that, although both the UK 
and US are close allies and members of NATO there still existed significant security walls 
between US and UK forces and it took time to sort out security clearances.  This has 
become extremely important in an age when everything is done on computer and he 
believed the UK should maintain a pool of officers with the necessary clearances to work in 
a US headquarters in the future.  This problem was particularly acute in the domain of 
tactical and operational intelligence.  
 22 
 
A certain synergy also emerged between the USMC and UK forces over the four years of 
their deployment in Helmand.  As a result, a high degree of integration was achieved in even 
the most sensitive areas of activity between the British and Americans. Perhaps the best 
illustration of this was the decision to combine the US and UK targeting cells, which existed 
to provide intelligence on insurgent activity. This capability relied heavily on the generation of 
information capabilities which states and militaries sometimes do not want to share with 
even their closest ally. However it became logical to combine rather than duplicate this 
activity in Helmand, and whilst it still took six months to bring about this merger a combined 
targeting cell was created.  This was cited as evidence of how closely integrated the British 
and Americans became in Helmand. cii  
 
Whilst the effort made to promote greater unity of command within RC South and then RC 
South West reduced the autonomy of the British it did address an important source of 
friction.  As has been said, the principal difference between UK and US relations in 
Afghanistan compared to Iraq was that the British were prepared to integrate themselves in 
a US chain of command.  It is also important recognise that the creation of unified command 
structure was not a silver bullet and it seems PJHQ continued to be a thorn in the side of the 
US led chain of command in RC South West and the problem of national politics did not go 
away. However, having British officers serving as deputy commander ISAF, deputy 
commander IJC and deputy commander of RC South West provided a filter through which 
requests from PJHQ and the American chain of command could be transmitted in a way that 
was more measured and balanced. Of particular importance here was the willingness of the 
national contingent commander to conduct a more equal dialogue with London regarding 
some of their requests.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this essay I have looked at the special relationship largely through the eyes of the British. 
It has set out, but not challenged the basic assumptions that have shaped and driven UK 
foreign policy on this subject over many decades. My main goal has been to explore how the 
British sought to sustain this relationship within the demanding environment of the war on 
terror. Of particular interest here is the way in which the cohesion of the alliance oscillated 
between Iraq and Afghanistan. Within this context I have challenged the notion that, like 
Iraq, the war in Afghanistan caused significant harm to the alliance. In my view, although the 
alliance in Afghanistan experienced many of the same problems as Iraq, the relationship did 
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not follow the same trajectory. If this proposition is accepted we then need to explain this 
variation. In my view, whilst I accept sentiment and interest played a part in shaping UK-US 
relations the fact that both variables had a constant presence over the span of the war on 
terror suggests the cause of this variation is to be found elsewhere.  An important difference 
between Iraq and Afghanistan was extent to which the allies institutionalised their relations 
within the campaign.  What allowed the benefits of this association to flourish in Afghanistan 
rather than Iraq was the joint commitment by the UK and US to the successful conclusion of 
this war by 2014.   Equally important, and again in contrast to Iraq, there was an agreement 
between the US and British militaries on the best strategy and operational plan to achieve 
this goal, a view which drew heavily on a common training and education in the UK and US 
and which allowed the British to work harmoniously with the USMC, a formation it had little 
contact with until they deployed to Helmand in 2008. As important was the willingness of the 
British to subordinate their forces within a US chain of command, something which existed 
only on paper in Iraq.  This became possible in Afghanistan because there was a military 
consensus on how to win.  Although, subordinate British commanders ensured they retained 
influence and could act as a filter which allowed them to manage American expectations 
regarding what British troops could do and the UK government’s expectations that they do 
nothing that might entail British casualties. In essence, we went from a position of zero sum 
gain in Iraq to one of gainshare in Afghanistan or at least an approximation of this. This 
reinforces Haglund’s point: the special relationship needs more than sentiment or interest to 
sustain its cohesion especially when dealing with the stresses of war. Intuitively, both the 
British and American militaries understood this in 1940 when they set up an entirely new 
allied organisational apparatus to plan and run the war, but in spite of decades of 
cooperation, both needed to relearn this lesson on a more modest scale in the war on terror.  
 
Finally, if we accept the proposition that the British military succeeded in its mission of 
redeeming itself in the eyes of its most important ally in Afghanistan we also need to assess 
the extent to which this allowed the UK to shape or influence US policy.  Such thinking is, in 
part, an historical legacy stemming from the Second World War and, in particular, the 
success of the British at the Casablanca Conference in January 1943 where they got their 
more powerful ally to commit to a grand strategy which suited British rather than American 
interests.ciii  However, the example of Iraq in 2002-03 suggests that it is unsafe to assume 
that, because a state makes a significant military contribution to an ally's campaign, this 
automatically translates into political influence over that ally.civ However, it is interesting how 
such thinking persists. The quote by Sherard Cowper-Coles at the start of this essay 
provides proof of that. It is also interesting that in evidence given to the Foreign Affairs 
Committee in 2011, journalist James Ferguson, asserted that, as the second largest 
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contributor to the war in Afghanistan, the UK was in a better position than any US ally to 
shape American policy. Indeed the US has recently stressed how important the size and 
capacity of UK defence is in sustaining its position as a key ally.cv But, in the case of 
Afghanistan, having reflected on this linkage, Cowper Coles concluded at the end of his 
memoir that perhaps the only tangible evidence of British influence over US policy was that it 
accelerated the willingness of the US to accept that a political settlement in Afghanistan 
required that the Afghan government talk to the Taliban; a process which was difficult to sell 
to the American electorate because of the perceived connection between the Taliban, Al 
Qaeda and 9/11. cvi  But he also points out that the US would have arrived at this conclusion 
eventually and that the most the UK could claim was that it speeded up this process of 
deliberation. cvii  Consequently, although the British military relationship with its American 
counterpart did improve it is not clear this significantly enhanced the influence of the UK 
government in Washington or Kabul.  At best it helped to stabilise relations between the US 
and UK and reversed its downward trajectory.  
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